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HOW AMERICAN JUDGES INTERPRET
THE BILL OF RIGHTS*
Norman Dorsen**
I

American courts have considerable power to affect government by exercising the power to invalidate, and thus render inoperative, federal and state statutes or the executive acts of federal
and state officials (including the President himself) which they
consider to be in conflict with a provision of the United States
Constitution. All federal and state judges have the authority in
appropriate cases to wield this power of judicial review, but the
stakes are highest in the United States Supreme Court.
Americans take the subject of judicial review very seriously.
The recent Senate hearings into the confirmation of President
Clinton's nominee to the Supreme Court, Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, were tranquil by comparison to those that preceded
them. From 1987 to 1991 Robert Bork, Anthony Kennedy,
David Souter, and Clarence Thomas each underwent exhaustive
and exhausting public grilling on their philosophies of law, their
philosophies of life, and indeed their lives themselves. All but
Bork eventually were confirmed by the Senate, but Thomas
barely made it, by a vote of 52-48. The reason for the intense
hearings was, of course, the recognition that the stakes are enormous when each of the nine Supreme Court Justices represents
one-fifth of the votes needed to determine the direction of the
country on all sorts of basic matters.
Judicial review in the United States is not a paper tiger. To
take some early examples, the Supreme Court in 1857 held that
African-American slaves had no rights under the Constitution,
* Professor Dorsen delivered this address in Australia in August 1993, under the
auspices of the Centre for International and Public Law and the Law Foundation of New
South Wales, at Melbourne University Law School, at the Law School of the Australian
National University in Canberra, and at the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities
Commission in Sidney. It has been revised for publication. The author acknowledges the
helpful comments on an earlier draft of Professor Julian Disney of the ANU and
Professor Sarah Barringer Gorden of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
•• Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. President,
American Civil Liberties Union 1976-1991.
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and never could have such rights.! It thereby thwarted a congressional attempt to fashion a compromise on the slavery issue
and avert a bloody Civil War. In the 1870's, following the war,
the Supreme Court voided congressional efforts to legislate full
citizenship for former slaves.2
In the early twentieth century the Supreme Court regularly
struck down federal and state social legislation that provided for
minimum wages, maximum hours, the protection of labor unions,
and the outlawing of child labor .3 In mid-century, the Court operated with a more liberal philosophy but no less vigorously. For
example, from 1954 to 1973 it declared unconstitutional the
American version of racial apartheid, organized prayer in state
schools, and laws prohibiting or restricting abortion.4 And it told
President Harry Truman that he could not lawfully take over and
run privately-owned steel mills when a labor dispute threatened
the production of steel for the armed services during the Korean
War.s
How does one justify, or even explain, the Supreme Court's
pattern of decision in constitutional cases so as to explain and
perhaps justify judicial review, probably the greatest contribution
that the United States has made to political theory and civil liberty? In order to address this question, I shall begin by identifying six pairs of Supreme Court rulings, in each of which the later
decision was a radical change of direction from the earlier one. I
shall then discuss five key factors which I believe affect judges
when they are interpreting the Constitution, especially the Bill of
Rights. I shall conclude by venturing some explanations, based
on these five factors, for the changes in direction in each of the
pairs of decisions that I have identified.
Three of the six pairs concern equality issues under the constitutional provision that prohibits government from "denying to
any person ... the equal protection of the laws." The other three
deal with free expression under the constitutional provision that
prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press."
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
2. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Thrning first to the three equality pairs, what explains the
change from 1896, when the Supreme Court upheld the forced
segregation of black people into "separate but equal" schools
and other public accommodations,6 to 1954, when in Brown v.
Board of Education it declared "separate but equal" facilities to
be unconstitutional? Second, what explains the change from earlier judicial decisions that permitted government discrimination
on the basis of gender? to recent cases in which the Court has
struck down almost all such inequalities?s And third, in light of
the acknowledged constitutional protection for sexual privacy,
what explains the Court's approval in 1986 of laws that criminalize consensual homosexual sodomy?9
As to the three "free expression" pairs, why did the
Supreme Court uphold the convictions of Communist leaders in
1951 for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government
by force and violence but reverse the convictions of other top
Communists in 1957 under the same charge?to Can one reconcile the Court's willingness to sustain the conviction of a man for
burning his draft registration card in protest against the Vietnam
warn with its more recent declaration that burning the American
flag as a political protest is constitutionally protected expression?tz Finally, why did the Court in 1952 permit Illinois to send
a man to jail under a criminal libel law for defamation of Jews
and blacks,B but twelve years later strike down a huge libel judgment against the New York Times for printing an advertisement
which falsely alleged that an Alabama official harrassed and arrested civil rights workers without cause?t4
There are scores of similar pairings, including cases from
other areas of constitutional litigation such as criminal justice,
religion and the state, the rights of private property, and the separation of powers among the branches of government. But the
examples I have selected should suffice for present purposes.
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
8. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Coun of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
9. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
10. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), with Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
11. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
13. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
14. New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Accordingly, I tum now to five factors that largely determine
how courts interpret the Bill of Rights.
II

The first factor is the degree to which individual judges are
in fact committed to the principle of judicial review. This may
seem strange in light of the fact that the Supreme Court asserted
the reviewing power as long ago as 1803 and its authority is now
thoroughly established.
But throughout American history there have been those
who denied the validity of judicial review. Not two decades after
Marbury a state court contended that "the foundation of every
argument in favor of the right of the judiciary, is found, at last, to
be an assumption of the whole ground in dispute."1s As recently
as 1938 a well-known scholar maintained, in rather overheated
prose, that Marshall's reasoning in Marbury was "baseless," and
that the arguments supporting the restriction of "the will of a
democratic majority by the judgment of a few elderly gentlemen"
(that is, the judges) were "precisely those which the adherents of
Hitler and Mussolini use against the frailty of democratically representative or elective govemment."16 More recently, a leading
federal judge, Learned Hand, lent his voice to those who
doubted the general grant of judicial review in the Constitution,
although he conceded at the end that it was "essential to prevent
the defeat" of the government established in 1789 for the
Supreme Court to assume at least some of this power.17
The approach of Judge Hand and the other critics is consistent with a long tradition that cautions the Supreme Court not to
exercise its prerogative whenever it "sees, or thinks that it sees,
an invasion of the Constitution. "Is In this view a court can invalidate a statute only when those "who have the right to make laws
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one-so clear that it is not open to rational question."19 Judge
Hand, in short, by grudgingly recognizing a right of judicial review, implicitly cautioned judges to exercise the power with extreme reluctance.
15. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 353 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
16. Morris R. Cohen, The Faith of a Liberal 182-185, 192 (Henry Holt and Co.,
1946).
17. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 10-15 (Harv. U. Press, 1958).
18. ld. at 14.
19. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893).
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This is not the occasion, nor is it necessary, to recount in
detail the many reasons that judicial review has survived these
assaults for almost two centuries. The arguments derive from the
text of the Constitution and its contemporary history. They also
stem from a perception of democratic theory which validates a
role for a judicial body that acts both as umpire of our federal
system and as protector of minorities and unpopular segments of
society.
The key point is that the freedom with which a judge approaches the question whether to nullify a statute or executive
act turns in part on how solid a footing the judge believes judicial
review has under the Constitution and in a democracy. In particular, if a judge believes it is inherently undemocratic to overrule
the actions of the elected branches of government he or she will
tend to be diffident and cautious. On the other hand, if a judge
believes that the judiciary is an authorized ingredient of a properly functioning democracy, the judge will feel far freer in exercising judicial review under the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

III
A second element determining how judicial review is exercised concerns the appropriate technique or techniques for interpreting the Constitution. This factor was brought dramatically to
the attention of Americans in 1985 by Edwin Meese, then the
Attorney General to President Ronald Reagan.
In a speech to the American Bar Association Mr. Meese
said that the Reagan Justice Department "will endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes
as the only reliable guide for judgment."zo This statement was
widely reported and sparked an unusual popular interest in the
hitherto specialized subject of constitutional interpretation. It
also stimulated a barrage of responses, including unprecedented
reactions from two sitting Supreme Court Justices, William J.
Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens.zt
In limiting judges solely to "original meaning," that is to the
text and the history behind the text, Mr. Meese ignored the fact
that the Supreme Court regularly has resorted to at least four
20. Edwin Meese III, Speech before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985,
printed in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Wrinen Constitution 1, 10 (The Federalist
Society, 1986) (emphasis added). See also Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of
Original Intent, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 5, 10 (1988).
21. William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2
(1985); John Paul Stevens, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 15 (1985).
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other types of justification for its decisions-arguments from the
purposes or theory of the Constitution, arguments from the Constitution's structure, arguments based on judicial precedent, and
arguments based on moral, political, and social values. It is not
my intention now to discuss whether the justices have employed
these arguments well or badly, or too much or too little. It is
rather to point out the obvious-that they have been, must be,
and should be part of the legal intellectual capital on which the
Court draws in deciding hard questions presented by the "great
generalities of the Constitution," such as "due process of law,"
"equal protection of the laws," and "private property."
The appeal to moral or social values is, of course, the most
controversial criterion I have mentioned and the one that Mr.
Meese would no doubt find most objectionable. But such values
have long been employed by conservatives as well as liberals.
For example, Justice Lewis Powell invalidated a housing ordinance that restricted the right of extended families (grandparents
and cousins as well as the nuclear family) to live together because
"the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."zz Chief Justice Warren Burger in a leading
case concluded that obscenity could be banned in the interests of
a "decent society."z3 And in one of his last opinions, Burger held
that high schools may punish an off-color speech by a student
because it is the duty of schools to enforce "fundamental values,"
including "habits and manners of civility" essential to a democratic society. "24
One need not embrace a jurisprudence of social values to
recognize that in many, if not most, constitutional controversies it
is simply not possible to ascertain the "original intention" of the
authors of the document. Some issues arising today could not
have been foreseen in the eighteenth century, others were never
discussed, and still others were the objects of conflicting "intentions" both at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 that proposed the Constitution and at the state conventions that ratified
it. Furthermore, the records of the debates at the Convention
are incomplete and possibly inaccurate. That is why James
Madison deliberately delayed the publication of his notes on the
Convention until after his death, asserting that as a guide to ex22. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
23. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,69 (1973) (quotingJacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
24. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986), quoting Charles
Beard and Mary Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (Doubleday, 1968).
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pounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates lacked any authoritative character.2s
The upshot of all this is that we can't stop the world and get
off. The Constitution must be interpreted by contemporary
judges in the only way they can-as citizens of the late twentieth
century. Among others, Justice Benjamin Cardozo expressed
this thought when he said that the "great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to
age. "26 Earlier, Chief Justice Marshall recognized the principle,
in words no less true for being familiar, when he described the
Constitution as an instrument "intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."21 Almost a century later the Supreme Court
said, "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions."2s There are many such authoritative statements.
Finally, it is important to observe that Mr. Meese-unlike
some other textualists-had a political agenda. Justice Brennan
perceived this clearly. In replying to Meese he said that "while
proponents of this facile historicism justify it as a depoliticization
of the judiciary, the political underpinnings of such a choice
should not escape notice."29 The nature of Mr. Meese's political
agenda is apparent, namely, to resolve the Constitution's textual
ambiguities against claims of individual right. By skewing all inquiry toward a spurious "original intention," Mr. Meese would
require the rejection of any civil liberties claim that could not be
supported by hard evidence from the late eighteenth century.
Such evidence is very difficult to come by, not only because of
the problems associated with ascertaining "original intention,"
but also because concepts concerning the individual's relation to
the state differed drastically at that time. There is no warrant for
such a crabbed view of constitutional interpretation.

25. See Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10
Const. Comm. 297, 298-99 (1993).
26. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (Yale U. Press,
1921).
27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
28. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
29. See Brennan, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 21).

386

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:379

IV
A third factor relates to the strength of a judge's commitment to the values underlying particular sections of the Bill of
Rights. To illustrate, no Justice of the Supreme Court would belittle the institution of private property as a bedrock of the capitalist free enterprise economy or as an important basis for
individual security and independence. Yet the Justices vary considerably in their willingness to tolerate government regulations
of business and other forms of property. These decisions reflect,
at least in part, different levels of attachment to the property
principle.
Another example concerns free expression. In the course of
many years of academic discourse and courtroom combat relating to free speech, I rarely have found a person who openly deprecates its worth. To the contrary, everyone professes to support
free speech, much as everyone claims to have a good sense of
humor, and to be open-minded. Why, then, the sharp differences
among judges in their protection of free speech under the First
Amendment? The difference turns not merely on whether a
judge supports free speech, but rather on the degree to which he
or she does so. Intensity of this sort cannot be measured, but it is
palpable in some judicial opinions and not in others-as it is in
the books and articles of some scholars and not others. It stems
from a deep source within each person, where basic values reside. As the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart observed
about hard-core pornography, one knows it when one sees it.
A final example of this point focuses on a prominent
Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter, who served from 1939
to 1962. When Frankfurter was appointed to the Court from a
professorship at Harvard Law School, the liberal community
rejoiced. For instance, the editor of a leading liberal magazine,
The Nation, said, "I must record my profound gratitude to President Roosevelt for the appointment of Felix Frankfurter. . . . I
do not believe that in my lifetime anyone has been appointed to
the bench who was better qualified or more truly liberal."3°
Yet Frankfurter confounded the liberals (and nearly everyone else) by becoming the leading exponent of judicial restraint
of his era. Again and again he led the Court in conservative rulings relating to free speech, criminal justice, and equal protection, or he dissented from liberal decisions in these and other
areas. But there were three principal exceptions to his restrained
30.

Oswald Garrison Villard, Issues and Men, 148 Nation 94 (1939).
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approach-separation of church and state under the Establishment Clause was one, academic freedom was a second, and the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment was the third. In those areas Frankfurter
was an aggressive liberal, consistently upholding individual
claims against the government. This inconsistency is explained
by Frankfurter's special commitment to the values underlying
these constitutional guarantees. The commitment arose in the
first instance because of personal experience as a member of a
minority religion, in the second because of his decades as a professor, and in the third in his capacity as intellectual heir to his
mentor Justice Louis Brandeis's devotion to the right to privacy,
the "right to be let alone."3t

v
A fourth thread in the judges' tapestry is possibly even more
imponderable than the intensity factor. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated the idea, in his characteristically Olympian way,
when he said that the "felt necessities of the time"32 were critical
determinants in the development of law. It has been put more
defensively by others such as Professor Alexander Bickel, who
said that "a court that decided the equivalent of five cases such as
Brown v. Board of Educ. in a single year would have seen the
end of the institution, I am sure."33 The common element in
these remarks is that public opinion has a powerful effect on
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, even though lifetime
tenure insulates them from crass retribution for their decisions.
Public opinion may be transitory or may reflect a more general
cultural context in which a decision is rendered.
31. Justice Brandeis's devotion to privacy norms was manifested early. See Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890)
("[N]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let
alone"). See also Olmstead v. United States, 217 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In contexts other than the Fourth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter had a more
limited attachment to privacy values. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959) (freedom of association) and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (privilege
against self-incrimination).
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown and Co., 1881).
The full sentence from which this phrase is taken is central to the thesis of this paper:
"The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed." Id.
33. Anhur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States Supreme
Coun in Civil Libenies Cases, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 457, 476 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1964).
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A perceptive formulation of this point was rendered by
James L. Oakes, a judge of the same court of which Learned
Hand was a member. Judge Oakes wrote:
It is also a bit of a myth to think that lifetime tenure operates to create irresponsibility. Lives are short; reputations are
meaningful. There is, I venture to suggest, hardly an institution that operates with so many built-in checks and balances
capable of instant criticism: one's fellow judges, higher courts,
lower courts, law professors, law reviews, law writers, law
clerks, lawyers' associations, families, and, yes, to an ever
greater and more professional extent, the press. All or almost
all of our actions are matters of public record; most of the reasons for taking them are openly and publicly stated for all to
see and to criticize.34

Judge Oakes concluded that "the legitimacy of judicial solution
to many of the most perplexing problems of the day must be, and
is, ultimately supported by the accountability of the judiciary to
the people. "35
Put another way, judges (especially Justices of the United
States Supreme Court) do not live in a disembodied vacuum, but
exist as part of the hard real world where their decisions will be
closely reviewed by every segment of society and ultimately redound to each judge's enhanced or impaired reputation. This is
bound to influence decision-making.
VI
The fifth and final consideration is the degree to which
judges are sensitive to the core purpose of the Constitution. This
is very different from deciphering the meaning of a particular
clause or word. Rather it is a question of commitment to the
Constitution's general purposes. These purposes are stated movingly in its Preamble: "to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty" for all posterity. In human terms, the desire to "establish
justice" and "secure the blessings of liberty" is the ultimate goal
of the Constitution. Government efficiency, international influence, domestic order and economic needs are all important, but
none exceeds justice and liberty as the heart of the constitutional
commitment to the people of the United States.
34. James L. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 948-49 (1979).
35. ld. at 949.
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This conclusion is confirmed by many reliable indicia of constitutional purpose. The first is the structure of the Constitution,
which protects individual liberty through the dispersion of power
among the branches of government, thereby adopting Montesquieu's insight that liberty cannot exist if the judiciary is not separated from the legislative and executive.36
The second is the text of the Constitution, which as originally ratified and promptly amended by the Bill of Rights protects liberty in numerous provisions. In this connection, it is of
prime importance that without promises from the Federaliststhe majority party at the time-that a bill of rights would be added as soon as a government was installed, the Constitution almost surely would not have been ratified by the states.
Third, the Federalist Papers, which provide the best contemporary discussion of the theory of the Constitution, are replete
with concern for individual justice and the interests of minorities.
For example, in one issue Madison referred to the "preservation
of liberty" as the essence of government. In another, he spoke of
the need for "measures" to be decided "according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party," and not "by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."J7
Despite several references to "the minority" in the Federalist Papers, we should appreciate that "equality" was not uppermost in the minds of the Framers of the Constitution. All the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention were men, and women hardly were mentioned in the debates. Slavery was countenanced in three clauses of the Constitution, although the word
itself never appeared. As the late Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote when the bicentennial of the Constitution was celebrated
in 1987, even after the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 guaranteed equal protection of the laws to blacks as well as to whites,
"almost another century would pass before any significant recognition was obtained of the rights of black Americans to share
equally even in such basic opportunities as education, housing,
and employment, and to have their votes counted, and counted
equally. "Js
Whether one admires the handiwork of the Framers of the
Constitution without reservation, or regards it as partially flawed
36. See generally Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner, 1949).
37. The Federalist No. 51 at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New American Library, 1961); The Federalist No. 10, id. at 77 (James Madison).
38. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987).
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or incomplete, it is plain that a great danger to liberty-perhaps
the greatest danger-lies in what Madison called "the community," that is, the majority. The conservative English writer Edmund Burke concurred with this sentiment at almost the same
time, saying that in a "democracy the majority of citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority."39 Madison's essential premise was that even in a democracy
the majority must be subject to limits that assure individual liberty, and that the democratic political process requires a check
through a politically insulated body in order to guarantee the
right of individuals, including the most obnoxious, to vote, to
speak, and to be treated fairly and with equal respect and dignity.
A judge's attachment, or lack thereof, to these general purposes and principles will powerfully affect his or her rulings in
particular cases.
VII
While recognizing that a far more extensive analysis would
be required to do full justice to the six pairs of rulings that introduced the discussion, it is nevertheless time to apply my general
observations about how judges approach the Bill of Rights to
these concrete settings.
The first pair comprised two segregation cases. In 1896,
when the Supreme Court legitimized apartheid, judicial review
on behalf of individual rights was still undeveloped, meaning that
few of the Justices saw their role as protector of the Bill of
Rights. Further, it is unlikely that any one of the Justices but the
dissenting John Marshall Harlan accepted the extensive governmental intervention that would be necessary to bring the freed
slaves fully into American life. Finally, by that time the white
backlash to the Civil War and its egalitarian impulses had become settled public policy, making it easy for the Court to ignore
the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (let alone the general purpose of the Constitution
to protect individual rights).
In contrast, by 1954 when Brown v. Board of Education was
decided, there was a much firmer sense in American society of
the Equal Protection Clause's general principle, and there were
many members of the Court committed to racial equality. The
Second World War and its aftermath contributed greatly to
change and-also in the category of the "felt necessities of the
39. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 139 (Doubleday, 1989).

1994]

JUDGES AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

391

times" -the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and
China rendered the system of racial stratification highly embarrassing to American interests abroad. This was pointed out in
the Eisenhower Administration's amicus curiae brief to the
Supreme Court.
The second pair involved decisions in relation to women's
rights. The enhanced constitutional protection of women's rights
beginning in 197140 was also heavily influenced by the times, in
particular the rise of the women's movement at the end of the
1960's. This factor was of critical importance because it could not
be claimed that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (ratified in 1868) was intended to provide special
protection for women. Furthermore, at least three JusticesWilliam 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall-were thoroughly committed both to the general liberty
purposes of the Constitution as well as to the specific agenda of
female equality. Most of the other Justices recognized that the
idea's time had come.
Thrning to our third pair of cases, it is hard to understand
why the Court upheld the sodomy conviction of a homosexual,
albeit by a narrow 5-4 vote.4t After all, the gay rights movement
was fully organized by 1986, when the decision was rendered, and
there were several strong civil libertarians on the Court.
The explanation for Bowers v. Hardwick has several strands.
Initially, the case was pressed on the same sexual privacy theory
that had been used successfully in the abortion rights cases; by
the mid-1980's four Justices rejected the abortion decisions and
were unwilling to extend them further in any direction. Second,
there has always been in American culture a deep antipathy towards homosexuals. This antipathy surfaced most recently in the
bitter and largely unsuccessful legislative struggle to accord lesbians and gay men equal rights in the military. Finally, the frightening AIDS epidemic that was relatively new in 1986 cast a harsh
light on homosexual lifestyles and severely prejudiced their
claims for equal treatment. Despite these rationales, the case apparently was decided by a hair because one of the five member
majority, Justice Lewis Powell, said soon after his retirement that
he had long agonized over Bowers v. Hardwick and concluded
later that he had made a mistake.42
40. See Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. See Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, Nat'l. L.J.
Nov. 5, 1990 at 3.
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The first pair of "free expression" cases was the two prosecutions of Communist leaders. In 1951, at the heart of the Cold
War, a large majority of the Supreme Court expressly doubted
their capacity, as judges, to second guess the Congress on matters
of national security.43 In other words, the justices lacked confidence in the authority of judicial review in these circumstances.
Six years later, with a waning of McCarthyism at home (including
the eclipse and death of Senator Joe McCarthy) and a softening
of international tension after the death of Joseph Stalin, the
Court eased its stance and imposed heavy restrictions on conspiracy prosecutions of Communists that effectively ended such prosecutions.44 By that time, too, Earl Warren was Chief Justice and
there were four strong civil libertarians on the Court; the shift to
a generally more protective view of individual rights was well on
the way.
The next pair comprised the draft-card and flagburning decisions, which are so similar doctrinally. Like the Communist
cases, they are partly explicable by national security concerns or,
more precisely, the public's emotional reaction to war. In 1969,
when the Supreme Court upheld the law prohibiting public destruction of a draft card,45 most members of the Court were dedicated to principles of civil liberty and to freedom of expression,
and none of them would have agreed with Edwin Meese's narrow approach to the Constitution. Thus, their unwillingness to
protect a pyrotechnic protest, unlike the liberal decision invalidating the flag-burning statute two decades later, was rooted
elsewhere. In my opinion, that root was the Court's belief in
1969 that public opinion was offended by the widespread and vigorous opposition to the Vietnam war and, more generally, by the
flamboyant 1960's counterculture. Consequently, it feared erosion of the Court's standing with the public on a matter which
was highly emotional but relatively minor, certainly in comparison with the Warren Court's broader agenda.
By contrast, in our final pairing public opinion was far less of
a factor. In 1952, when the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois
statute that proscribed group defamation of Jews and blacks,46
few people were aroused by the controversy. In 1964, when the
Court reversed the Alabama libel judgment against the New
43. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
44. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
u.s. 444 (1969).
45. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
46. See Beauhamais, 343 U.S. 250.
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York Times,47 the public was divided over the civil rights movement which had precipitated the incident leading to the inaccurate advertisement. The different results in the two cases seem to
tum on the far greater commitment of the later Supreme Court
to the principle of free speech, even when the words insult individuals or vulnerable groups. This is an illustration of the intensity factor: the 1964 Court was willing to subordinate the
competing values of personal reputation and possible civic strife
to the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment.

VIII
The variety and complexity of the issues that arise under the
Bill of Rights defy easy categorization or synthesis. In presenting
a series of considerations that seem to me important to judges, I
am acutely conscious of the incompleteness of the analysis. The
cases discussed represent only a portion of constitutional
problems. Moreover, I have not alluded to the complexities introduced by precedent (including stare decisis) or by issues of
statutory construction and administrative law that are intertwined with constitutional law. I have eschewed these topics because discussion of precedent as well as statutory and
administrative issues would take us far afield. Despite these
omissions I hope that I illuminated in some small way the awesome power of judicial review.

47.

See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.

